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I. INTRODUCTION
Some of my friends tell me that, as a general proposition, as men
get older they become more conservative, but as women get older they
become more radical. Allan Hutchinson's new book, It's All in the
Game,1 tells us little about the latter, but it does seem to confirm the
former. For almost twenty five years, Allan Hutchinson has been a very
high profile "North American crit." There is little doubt that he has been
Canada's most prolific and outspoken critical legal scholar. He has been
a masterful trasher, combining powerful critical analytical skills with a
wicked wit and an enviable writing style to produce some critical classics.
But now, he springs a book that represents a significant departure, or
perhaps even a retreat, 2 in his scholarship.
In Game, Hutchinson articulates a "non-foundationalist"
account of law and adjudication, one that is both descriptive and

© 2000, Richard F. Devlin.
• Professor, Dalhousie Law School. Thanks to Vaughan Black, Meekis Manolis and Anette
Sikka for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this review.
1 A.C. Hutchinson, It's All in the Game (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2000)

[hereinafter Game].
2 Hutchinson seems to admit as much, ibid at 344.
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prescriptive, an exercise that is "critical and constructive in equal
measure."3 To achieve this goal, he attempts to distinguish his "ludic" 4
position from two rival alternatives: foundationalism and antifoundationalism. The former camp is densely populated with some
rather quite curious bedfellows: Hart, Madam Justice Wilson, Dworkin,
Weinrib, Sunstein, Fraser, MacKinnon, Trebilcock, Marx, and even
Unger. The latter camp, or perhaps it is more of a huddle, comprises
some of Hutchinson's erstwhile allies, most notably Kairys and Tushnet.
The basic argument is relatively straightforward: the foundationalists are
wrong because, despite their best intentions, they rely on an
epistemology that ultimately invokes some universalizing Truth claim;
the anti-foundationalists are in error when they suggest that adjudication
is simply crass ideological politics gussied up in fancy law talk and that
"anything goes."s Hutchinson's non-foundationalist position explicitly
attempts to carve out a middle path between the (too soft)
foundationalist credo of constraint and the (too hard) antifoundationalist credo of flexibility by continually claiming the (just right)
non-foundationalist slogan "anything might go." 6 The reconstructive
ambitions of the project-"to contribute significantly to the rebirth of
law as a 'generative force of our public life' and the revival of
jurisprudence as an 'inspiration' to judicial practitioners" 7 -give the
book a decidedly optimistic, if not jaunty, tone.
There is much that I admire in Game. Although it draws on some
parts of his previously published work, Game is a coherent, tightly
argued monograph that avoids the current'trend of combining a series of
loosely strung together previously published articles which is then
presented as a book. Hutchinson's ludic writing style is as lucid as ever
and there are some memorable turns of phrase, analogies and
metaphors. Indeed, there is much in the core message that dovetails
with, and enriches, my own "bungee cord" theory of judging.8 However,
there are a couple of infelicities and several ambivalences, or perhaps
even contradictions, that render the project somewhat flawed.
3 Supra note 1 at ix.

4 Ibid at xi, 294.
5Ibid. at 180.
6
7

Ibid. at 8, 17,37, 60, 84, 118, 166, 181,252,278,288.

Ibid. at 321.
8 See, for example, R.F. Devlin, A.W. MacKay & N. Kim, "Reducing the Democratic Deficit:
Representation, Diversity and the Canadian Judiciary, or, Towards a Triple P Judiciary" (2000) 38
Alta. L, Rev. 734 at 745-52.
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Hutchinson's ambivalences relate to both the descriptive and
prescriptive aspects of the enterprise. What follows then is a sympathetic
and internal critique on three levels: concerns about the way in which
Hutchinson plays the language game; doubts about the accuracy and
adequacy of the descriptive claims; and reservations about the cogency
and optimism of his prescriptive vision.
II. PLAYING THE LANGUAGE GAME
As I have indicated previously, Hutchinson is an excellent and
engaging writer. However, sometimes his use of language undercuts his
egalitarian and progressive ambitions. For example, on several occasions
Hutchinson's pursuit of analogies may generate some cause for concern.
Persons with disabilities might well be perturbed by the following
propositions: "In short, [Weinrib's] law would be autistic: it would spend
every day in morbid self-absorption and self-contemplation;" 9 "yet it is
only in the dark kingdom of the blind that such one-eyed upstarts can
feign regal right."10 Elsewhere he asserts: "[a]djudication is not
carpentry. While judges would do well to include the equivalent judicial
pride in their work, they must also be designers and innovators who
place their professional craft in the service of political values and
ideals."11
Even more problematic is the game theme that pervades the
book. While it would be unfair to argue that Hutchinson's ludic
conception of adjudication is either ludicrous,1 2 "quietistic" 13 or
trivializing of the human interests at stake, 14 and while I agree that "the
turn to rhetoric need not be a turn away from politics,"15 nonfoundationalism is unfortunately "short on bite" in the "progressive

9 Game, supra note 1 at 145.
10

Ibid at 112.

11 Ibid. at 293. Over the last couple of winters, I have apprenticed to a "carpenter" to build
two sea kayaks out of marine plywood. Although we worked from design plans and were motivated,
in part, by pride a large amount of energy was invested by the "carpenter" and the apprentice to
innovate and experiment to create craft well suited to the particular context of the Nova Scotia
coastline.
12
Ibid at 16.
13

Ibid. at ix.

14

Ibid. at 41, 42, 88.

15

Ibid. at 16.
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commitment to overcoming oppression and alleviating suffering." 16 This
is because there is a significant ambiguity in the work. Despite one early
warning that he is not really claiming that law is a game,) 7 Hutchinson
frequently falls prey to his own game metaphor. 8 In particular, in the
preface he notes that "over the years, I appreciate more and more that it
really is the case that it is the playing as much as the winning that counts
....- 19 He then follows this with a quotation from the great [Irish] soccer
player Danny Blanchflower:
the great fallacy is that the game is first and last about winning. It's nothing of the kind.
The game is about glory. It is about doing things in style, with a flourish, about going out
and beating the other lot, not waiting for them to die of boredom. 20

While this may be true of soccer,21 it is disturbing to translate this
wisdom to law. Winning matters in law. Take, for example, the death
penalty system in the United States. A recent report from Columbia
University questions "the reliability-indeed, the bare rationality-of

16

1bi& at ix.

17

Ibid.at 12.
18 See, for example, ibid. at 20-21: "[m]y own approach to games and, therefore adjudication,
is, by and large, philosophical. It is an attempt to make sense of one particular game-the stylized
activities of judges of common law countries in deciding cases ... [flor me, adjudication is a special
game of its own kind ... [w]hat it is to play the legal game of adjudication changes and develops as
the game is played ... ;" ibid at 33: " ... adjudication is not so much one particular type of game as it
is a shifting multiplicity of competing games;" ibid. at 36: "[b]eing a game of infinite possibilities,
adjudication ... ;" ibid. at 52: " ... adjudication as a special kind of nonfoundational game ... ;" ibid.
at 152:" ... I want to explore further what it means to take seriously the idea and practice of law and
adjudication as a playful and rhetorical activity;" ibid. at 166: "the adjudicative performance is an
entirely fluid and contingent game ... ;" ibid at 172: "adjudication is very much a special language
game ... ;" ibid. at 295: "judges [are] rhetorical participants in law's infinite language game ....
19
20

bid. [emphasis added].
Ibid at xi.

21 1 am not even sure of this. Such a perspective usually only manifests itself after a player has
finished their playing career. For example, as I write this review during Euro 2000, the European
Soccer Championship is underway. Romania had persuaded Gheorghe Hagi, perhaps their greatest
player ever, to come out of retirement to captain the team. They had an excellent first round,
especially in beating England 3-2, with Hagi distinguishing himself as one of the best players in the
competition. Later, in the quarterfinal game, with twenty minutes to go Italy were leading 2-0. Hagi,
on a break, took a dive in the eighteen yard box, hoping to secure a penalty kick thereby giving
Romania an opportunity to get back in the game. But the referee identified that this was a cheat
and sent Hagi off the pitch leaving Romania with one player less and finally losing the game. The
point is that for Hagi, everything was about winning. He was willing to finish a brilliant career, and
an outstanding competition, by cheating. He was humiliated by being sent off.
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the death penalty system as a whole."22 The authors found "that serious
error" had reached "epidemic proportions ... [m]ore than two out of

three capital judgments reviewed by the courts were found to be
seriously flawed." 23 In light of such contextualizing failure rates, can
Hutchinson be serious when he quotes David Thomson: "And winning
doesn't matter, because victory is always an illusion,"24 or when he posits
"the objective is not to win but to keep the game going"? 25
III. DUBIOUS DESCRIPTIONS
Beyond the foregoing metaphorical infelicities, there are also
some problems with the descriptive dimensions of the project. The first
is Hutchinson's attempt to construct an "anti-foundationalist" camp and
to legitimize his own position as so much more sensible than the
"anarchic indeterminacy" of "paranoid" and, nihilistic antifoundationalists who view law as "a mere hotch-potch of whimsy,
caprice, or perversity," or a "free-floating irrational grunt." 26 His basic
claim is that anti-foundationalists adopt "a position in which law is
reduced to raw power and adjudication is viewed as nothing more than a
faux exercise in ideological rationalization" 27 to argue that "anything
goes." In contrast, he argues "a more nuanced and sophisticated" 28
"anything might go" with the emphasis on the might.29 I have at least
three concerns about this strategy of legitimation.
First, as I read the work of those who he categorizes as antifoundationalists, when they claim "anything goes" they are not usually
saying that judges are absolutely arbitrary or engaging in "capricious
22 j. Liebman, J. Fagan & V. West, "A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 19731995" at 1 (2000), online: The Justice Project <http:ljustice.policy.net/jpreport/sectionl.html>
(date accessed: 28 May 2001) [hereinafter "A Broken System"].

23 Ibid.
24 Game, supra note 1 at xii [emphasis added]. Also, ibid. at 2, Hutchinson is vaguely aware of
this potential criticism in the introduction when he claims that "I do not intend to trivialize
adjudication by failing to appreciate that it is an exercise in power that has considerable effects on
and is affected by the terms and conditions of people's lives." However, when we are contemplating
the death penalty, for example, surely "considerable effects" is an understatement!
25
Ibid at 319.
26

Ibid. at 166, 209, 180, 149, 174.

27

Ibid. at 180-81, 214.

28

Ibid. at 180.

29

1biL at 8.
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irrationality," 30 or that there is no "formative structure or informing
context," 31 as Hutchinson suggests. Rather, they are positing that there
is a great deal of scope for interpretive discretion. The "anything goes"
claim is usually just a hyperbolic flourish, an intentional overstatement,
to make the point. For example, Hutchinson's critique of Kairys'
position underemphasizes the context in which it was written. It was
relatively early critical intervention designed to be a polemic. 32 Much
the same can be said of the two occasions when Hutchinson invokes the
extremism of Tushnet, again to legitimize his own more moderate
position. 33 This is not that different from Hutchinson's own argument
that adjudication is an "engaged game of rhetorical justification." 34 It
seems to me that Hutchinson has placed a too heavy epistemological
saddle on what were simply rhetorical moves. Now, while it might be
appropriate to criticize the early critics for the poverty of their rhetoric,
that is very different from claiming that they embrace a nonsensical
epistemology. (But even a critique of their rhetoric may not be possible
without a clear. articulation of the criteria for judgment of that rhetoric, a
point I will return to later.) An engagement with Duncan Kennedy's
more recent "bad faith" conception of adjudication would have been
more helpful. 35
Second, Hutchinson invokes the requirement of "good faith" to
serve as a "hallmark feature" of non-foundationalism, to signify "the
difference" between "ill-considered" anti-foundationalism and the
"more cogent" non-foundationalism. 36 However, when he attempts to
calibrate good faith, we are provided with a string of quite fuzzy ideals:
"integrity," "playing fair," "political reasonableness," and "do[ing] the
30

Ibi. at 186.

31 Ibid at 174.
32 In fact, as Kairys acknowledges, the article is an edited version of a speech given as part of a
book promotion tour. D. Kairys, "Law and Politics" (1984) 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 243.
33 Game, supra note 1 at 200, 310. A careful reading of one of these references indicates that
perhaps Tushnet was describing the realist approach to adjudication. Indeed Tushnet continues:
"[the realists] knew that certain lines of argument were in fact accepted at some times and places,
while others not less inherently acceptable were not in fact accepted." M.V. Tushnet, Red, White
and Blue: A CriticalAnalysis of ConstitutionalLaw (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1988) at 192. As we shall see, such a claim seems much closer to Hutchinson's non-foundationalist
position than the demonized anti-foundationalism.
34

Game, supra note 1 at ix.
35 D. Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication: Fin de Siecle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1997) at 56, 67.
36 Game, supra note 1 at 201, 190 [emphasis added], 190.
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right thing." 3 7 All he seems to exclude is that which is "patently

unreasonable." 38 If I am right in my suggestion that the so-called antifoundationalists were engaged in hyperbole for strategic reasons, then

they are unlikely to want to argue that judges can do patently
unreasonable things.39
Third, it is not clear to me that the slogan "anything might go"
really captures Hutchinson's message. When one reads the book in its
entirety, the impression one gets is that Hutchinson's main point is that

judges have much more discretion and freedom than they have hitherto
acknowledged, but there are still some significant constraints. However,
when he emphasizes the might in the slogan, he underemphasizes the
anything. But much of his actual argument is to emphasize against the
anti-foundationalists that there are constraints, both internal and
external, on the judicial interpretative role.40 Consequently, the slogan
should read more accurately as "some things might go." To take one
example, in a liberal democracy it would not appear to be legitimate for
the judiciary to declare war on another country.
In sum, Hutchinson's attempt to legitimize his own position
through the bogeymanization of anti-foundationalists is unpersuasive.
However, this is not fatal to his core project which is the rejection of
foundationalism.
A second descriptive problem relates to the ambitions of the
project and another possible ambiguity in his work. Although

37

1bidL at 190, 190, 191,195.

38 Ibid. at 193. Hutchinson forwards the doctrine of pecuniary interest as an example of
something that might qualify as patently unreasonable. He argues that "[w]hile pecuniary interest
in the outcome of a case has always been sufficient to disqualify a judge's participation or to
invalidate any decision made, there remains debate over the precise meaning and extent of
'pecuniary interest': there is a difference between a judge who is pro-business in orientation and one
who holds shares in a litigant's company." [at 197 footnote omitted] While the latter claim is
accurate, the former is not. Recently, the English Court of Appeal has overturned what was thought
to be a shibboleth of the common law of bias-pecuniary interest, however small, automatically
disqualifies-to argue that it depends on the size of the interest: Locabail v. Bayfield Properties,
[2000] 1 All E.R. 65 at 71. This is not just an issue of whether something qualifies as a pecuniary
interest; it is an acceptance of something that hitherto was considered to be patently unreasonable!
39 Moreover, as a regulative ideal, "good faith as anything that is not unreasonable" is a fickle
standard for it is only rarely that judges cannot find some discourse to justify their result; otherwise,
the parties would not likely have come to court in the first place.
40 Game, supra note 1 at 295. Also, see ibid. at 214-15: "Being always situated within a legal
context of freedom and constraint, judges (and jurists) are never fully restrained nor ever entirely
free;" and ibid. at 67 [emphasis added]:" ... none of this means that people are free to construct any
social world at all; the constraints of human vulnerability and the scarcity of different resources
forecloses certain options."
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Hutchinson warns on occasion that his aim is not to provide "a theory
of' adjudication but rather "an account of law and adjudication," 4 1 the
project seems to assume that adjudication is a relatively monolithic
phenomenon. In his introduction, he states that the focus of the work is
on appellate adjudication 42 and indeed his discussion of cases
throughout the book concentrates on decisions from a variety of
appellate courts. But often in the text there are propositions about
adjudication in a more generic sense. 43 This is most obvious in his
"assault upon easy cases," 44 as these do not normally generate appellate
review. Over the last ten years, I have participated in a number of
judicial education projects involving judges from every level of the
hierarchy: provincial, federal, court of appeal and the Supreme Court,
both in Canada and elsewhere. One of the most interesting aspects of
this experience has been my increasing awareness of the differences
between these distinct adjudicative functions. It is not just that lower
court judges have to deal with facts more than higher level judges. It is
almost as if different judicial clusters occupy different
locations-conceptually, spatially and temporally-in the constellation
of adjudication. For example, take the practice of giving reasons for
decision, a process which Hutchinson clearly believes is important given
his efforts to distinguish reasoning from rationalization in support of his
rhetorical thesis.4S In discussing the giving of reasons, Hutchinson barely
mentions the importance of audience, 46 but audience looms large in the
judicial mind and different levels of judges tend to contemplate different
audiences as they perform their judicial function and give reasons for
their decisions. There are a variety of possible audiences. The parties are
obvious ones, but these are not undifferentiated, for judges do
distinguish between different litigants depending on their identity, not
just in terms of bodies corporate versus human individuals versus
governments, but also in terms of age, gender and class. I have heard at
least one (English) judge advise other judges that the primary audience

41 Ibid at 19.
42

Ibid. at ix.

43 See, for example, ibid. at 6: "As interpreters, judges and referees are free to do what they
think best, not in spite of enabling rules, but because of them;" and ibid. at 20: "[I] attempt to make
sense of one particular game-the stylized activities of judges in common law countries in deciding
cases-...."
44

Ibid. at 77-81.

45 Ibid at 184-85.
46

There is one brief passing mention of the importance of audience at ibid. at 292.
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is the losing party. The lawyers are also an obvious audience, particularly
if there are possibilities for appeal. Other judges are a significant
potential audience. For trial judges, there are strong temptations to
make one's judgement appeal proof; appeal judges may be similarly
inclined, but they might also be seeking to provide direction to lower
courts. Often appeal court judges conceive their primary audience to be
their colleagues. More generally, there is also the practicing legal
community, academics, the media and the general public. Depending
upon which of these audiences are in the judicial mind, there are likely
to be different types of reasons given. Furthermore, this potential for
variability is intensified if we consider other complicating factors, for
example, resources and geographical location. 47 Even more importantly,
judges themselves are very aware of these differences and these have a
significant impact upon their conception of the parameters of the
possible. This is important because one of the crucial points that
Hutchinson relies upon in his attempt to distinguish his position from
the anti-foundationalist position is that his analysis "does not ignore the
judges's experience of their task as a 'rational, disciplined, and
constrained process."' 48 Thus, as an act of description, Hutchinson has
been insufficiently contextual in his account of adjudication.
IV. PROBLEMATIC PRESCRIPTIVISM
Neither of the descriptive flaws which I have identified is fatal to
the non-foundationalist enterprise. All they require are some
supplementary analyses. However, there are also some problems with
the prescriptive dimensions of the project that are significantly more
worrisome. Hutchinson makes some quite ambitious claims: nonfoundationalism has "political salience" 49 and "provides the most fitting
and effective complement to the transformative ambitions of a truly

47 Having worked with judges in a large number of jurisdictions in Canada, there are
significantly distinct judicial subcultures. The differences are not just between relatively well
supported superior and appellate courts as opposed to overburdened provincial courts, nor between
metropolitan courts and rural courts but even between courts which would appear to encounter
relatively similar conditions. To take one example, there is a different "feel" to the judiciary of
Saskatchewan than that of Manitoba.
48
Ibid.at 13. He also makes a similar point in his critique of Weinrib's foundationalism at ibid.
146.
49

Ibid. at 217.

554
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democratic politics."5 0 Indeed, his express goal is to encourage judges
"to turn their adjudicative energies to transformative effect."51 Given

these large claims, the fundamental question on the prescriptive side is
therefore "on what basis can a non-foundationalist analysis assess the
legitimacy of an adjudicative performance?" Unfortunately, Hutchinson
provides an ambivalent, if not contradictory, response. In his more
purely non-foundationalist moments he focuses on rhetorical prowess,5 2
at other times he suggests a more substantive benchmark. Hutchinson's
invocation of "good faith" is a useful analytical starting point. He is
adamant that the only function of good faith is to "make some telling
points"5 3 about anti-foundationalism. He continues,
[it is] not to argue that a case was decided rightly or wrongly; that would miss the point of
any nonfoundationalist analysis ... [the argument is] that while judges should and most of
the time often do tend to act in good faith, this requirement will not in itself crimp [sic]
their judicial style or limit the results that they achieve. 54

And he then goes on to discuss the Mhlungu case in which four different
judgments all qualify as reasonable and in good faith.55 He claims at one
point that "some of the judicial performances are more convincing than
others"5 6 and that "reasons can be given as to why one decision is better
than another,"5 7 but he fails to specify which ones are better and for
what reasons. All that we are provided with is the suggestion that
[t]he correctness of any particular move is established though persuasion and argument
:.. [and I]egitimacy, therefore, is something that does not precede or ground any
judgment given but rather follows or flows from the rhetorical force of the judgment
made.5 8
50

IbidL at 257 [emphasis added].

51

Ibid. at 15.

52 See, for example, ibiL at 150: "Law and adjudication are thoroughly human and, therefore,
flawed activities whose practices and performances earn as much legitimacy as they are able to
achieve through their rhetorical play;" ibid. at 181: "From a nonfoundationalist perspective, there
remains the insistence that there are legitimate and illegitimate ways to act, but there is also an
acknowledgement that 'legitimation can only spring from [judges'] own linguistic practice and
communicational interaction;"' and ibid. at 188: "From a nonformalist perspective, there are
standards by which the judicial performance can be assessed or criticized; law is a rhetorical
performance that can be played in better or worse ways."
53

bi. at 202.

54 Ibid. at 202.
55
56
57

Ibid at 201-15.
Ibid at 210.

Ibid at 211.
581Ibid
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But what are the standards by which Hutchinson evaluates
"good" rhetoric and therefore a better or even correct legal decision?
He is not adequately forthright in this regard. Clearly, consistency is out,
for it is the "hobgoblin of little minds."5 9 Getting it "right" or making it

"true" are also explicitly rejected. 60 His preference is to take us "back to
[rhetoric's] classical roots and implies the art of cogently presenting
ideas and arguments that does not insist on [its] own superiority." 61 If
this seems a bit obtuse, elsewhere he suggests that the key is
experimentation. 62 He elaborates that this entails "doing it well; great

players are those who understand the worth of experiment,
improvisation and transformation ... vision, technique, application,

industry, conditioning, insight, openness, fairness, humility, and a
willingness to experiment." 63 Elsewhere he celebrates "persuasion,"

"contradiction," "imagination and persuasion," imagination and style,
"timeliness, insight and argumentation," "the continuing responsibility
to dream and experiment in reasonable and reasoned ways," and an
ability "to carry the rhetorical day." 64 Such ludicism sounds remarkably

59 Ibid. at 9,213.
60

Ibd at 19.
61 Ibid.at 51-52.
62

Ibid.at 289.

63 Ibid at 19, 288. There is also something deeply individualistic about these standards, with
very little reference to the ability to be a team player. Hutchinson analogizes these judicial virtues to
those of a great soccer player. (Elsewhere he analogizes them to other great athletes, see ibid. at
300.) However, while these may manifest an individual talent, there is something missing. For
example, during the 1998 World Cup there was great emphasis put on the individual brilliance of
Ronaldo of Brazil and Beckham of England. Both players proved to be poor team members
(Ronaldo never got in the game and Beckham threw a temper tantrum) with disastrous
consequences for their teams. By contrast, it is often stated that one of the reasons why the former
chief justice of Nova Scotia was such a great judge was because he quietly but efficiently provided
stabilizing leadership. Much the same can be said of Pele, who was not only brilliant as an individual
soccer player for Brazil, but also a wonderful team member. On another occasion, Hutchinson
analogizes to the improvisational nature of jazz, see ibid at 178. In the movie The Commitments,
such solo efforts are wonderfully characterized as "wanker music." All of this is ironic in light of
Hutchinson's criticism of Unger as being excessively individualistic and heroic, see ibid. at 265-70.
I have similar concerns about Hutchinson's celebration's of Van Morrison, the so called
"Celtic Cowboy," see ibid.at x-xi.
64
Ibid at 170, 132, 34, 293, 200, 296, 200. He also suggests that certain rhetorical practices are
beyond the pale. For example, ibid. at 148, he agrees with Weinrib that judges must act in good faith
and that to use "legal discourse only as a cover for political decisions is illegitimate and can be
righteously deplored." Similar indictments are made of rationalization as opposed to reasoning or
rational debate, see, for example, ibid at 185 and 200-201.
This causes me some concern. As I will suggest later, Hutchinson seems to suggest two, not
necessarily compatible, sets of evaluative criteria: rhetorical prowess and progressivism. If he
actually endorses the second, this may cause problems for his indictments of certain rhetorical
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like a post-modernized version of the conventional liberal marketplace
of ideas: it is not that Truth will emerge triumphant, but rather that
legitimacy will accrue to the most talented rhetorician. 65
On other occasions, Hutchinson tentatively ventures beyond
stylistic criteria. He suggests the rather vague "usefulness and
acceptability," "persuasive or useful," "practical utility in particular
situations" and even "better or worse answers or even correct ones ...
'correct' in the contingent and contextual sense that certain people for
certain purposes at a certain time and place are persuaded that it is
correct." 66
However, interspersed throughout the book, there are other
more bold moments. He advocates that judges pursue
"transformati(on)," 67 "the valuable work of advancing the cause of social
justice in a democratic society," 68 "the human project of improved social
justice," 69 "justice and betterment,"70 "an enhanced social solidarity and
experience of justice,"71 plain and simple "social justice," 72 "a polity of
truly equal readers and engaged writers,"73 an "active dialogue of
competing voices," 74 an "open[ing] up [of] the essential dialogue of
world making," 75 "responsible skepticism and participatory
democracy," 7 6 "a participatory democracy that is egalitarian and
pluralist," 7 7 a "progressive politics ...[that] address[es] the real issues
that divide and plague society-economic deprivation, public illiteracy,
strategies. For example, assume that a judge is convinced that the death penalty system is "a broken
system" see "A Broken System,"supra note 22, and that the only way to keep an accused off death
row, and free from the threat of the gallows, is to engage in "bad faith rationalization," would
Hutchinson rightly deplore such a judicial strategy?
65 For example, Game, supra note 1 at 277. The core of his criticism of MacKinnon is that her
approach to pornography "tends to stifle debate rather than encourage it."
66
Game, ibid. at 45, 208, 155,157, 179.
67

1bid.at 15,121.

68

Ibid.at 16.

69

Ibi. at 46.

70

Ibid. at 257.

71

Ibid at 259.

72
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sexual violence, education, racial hatred, and other such issues," 78 "a
radical project of transformative politics," 79 a "subversive politics that is
committed to confronting and confounding the oppressive workings of
elite institutions"8 0 and "a more flexible and less oppressive social
structure."81 He even characterizes the ludic judge as a "happy-go-lucky
anarchistic sort of creature"8 2 who can "engender local hope in the
struggle to transform experience, to overcome suffering, and to endow
others with opportunities to remake their own world."8 3 In the
conclusion, he baldly states that "judges are to be judged by the political
merit of their practical performances, not the conceptual coherence of
their theoretical performances." 8 4 Such exhortations and evaluative
benchmarks clearly go beyond the play of rhetoric to suggest a more
substantive (and perhaps even foundationalist?) conception of
legitimacy.
My concerns about this apparent slipperiness and its prescriptive
consequences, can be best illustrated through a discussion of
Hutchinson's analysis of R.A. V.v. City of St. Paul8S (the cross burning
case). Hutchinson is critical of Justice Scalia's decision, but on what
basis? As a rhetorical performance, the opinion manifests many of the
hallmarks of what Hutchinson would appear to believe to be salutory
style. One could argue that Scalia is an exemplar of ludic prowess; his
use of precedent certainly appears to be innovative, experimental and
improvisational. The fact that he can persuade four of his colleagues to
concur8 6 and "win the rhetorical day" has to be impressive by
Hutchinson's standards. But, it is telling that having spent much of the
book locating legitimacy in rhetorical adeptness, Hutchinson explicitly
refuses to examine Scalia's (and the other Supreme Court judges')
performances on the basis of "rhetorical cogency."8 7 Rather, he uses the
case to argue that ludic judges would be more politically candid about
78

1bid at 111 [emphasis added].

791bid at 253.
80

Ibd.at 258.

81 Ibid. at 328.
82

Ibid. at 298.

83

Ibid

84

Ibid. at 322.

85 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) [hereinafter
86 Game, supranote I at 306.
87

Ibid. at 301.
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their underlying visions and ideals.88 All he can do is suggest that Scalia
is a hypocrite for not coming out of the non-foundationalist closet.8 9
And yet, it is clear that Hutchinson disagrees with Scalia in that he does
not believe that the free marketplace of ideas advances "social utility."90
However, Hutchinson himself has built much of his argument on
openness to the plurality of ideas and is explicitly critical of MacKinnon
for attempting to "stifle debate rather than encourage it."91 As a
consequence, it would appear that Hutchinson's position is really based
upon a substantive preference: he finds the "vile activity of white
supremacists" 92 more unpalatable than the peddling of pornography.
But, even then his ludic judge prevaricates in determining whether
censorship is the appropriate remedy 93 because of Hutchinson's
attachment to the circulation of the free flow of ideas.
Thus, RAv brings to the fore an underlying thematic tension for
Hutchinson. While the dominant register of the text has been to espouse
the progressivism of rhetoric, there is also a counter voice registering
caution. In passing, he seems to acknowledge that rhetoric is a risky,
perhaps wanton, conduit for the pursuit of legitimacy: law has a
"repertoire of argumentative moves," 94 a repertoire that is "almost
infinite."95 With commendable candour, he confesses that his ludic
analysis cannot guarantee a more progressive judiciary, 96 but most
importantly in his discussion of RAv, he actually concedes that nonfoundational ludicism can justify Scalian conservatism. 97 Given these
significant concessions what is it that justifies Hutchinson's categorical
claim that "it provides the most fitting and effective complement to the
transformative ambitions of a truly democratic politics"? 98 It would
appear that it can just as easily provide a "fitting and effective
complement to the [conservative] ambitions of a truly [reactionary]
88

Ibi at 309.
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Ibi. at 309.
Ibid. at 277.
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Ibi. at 310.
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politics." 99 Like natural law, non-foundationalism can be press-ganged
into the service of all kinds of political masters for it has "no necessary
direction [and] no necessary political program."1 00 To be told that "it is
not incompatible with a progressive politics" 101 is hardly sufficient to
justify the "the" claim. So where is the "prescriptive bite" and "political
salience" 102 which Hutchinson has proclaimed? Like the relative
autonomy thesis of which he is so critical, is his "anything might go"
account of law and adjudication "so ample that it can accommodate
almost all theorizing about law's relation to other social phenomena"? 103
As a result, the law and politics of "might" take on a different, perhaps
Hobbesian, meaning. As Hutchinson himself says:
there is no way of knowing whether the attempt to "do the right thing" might turn out to
be another way to "do the wrong thing." Because all strategies are hazardous and all

consequences are unpredictable, much will depend on the informing context and precise
there are no self-evidently correct actions or easy
timing of any particular intervention ...
answers but only different choices and questions." 1 0 4

If this is accurate, and I believe it is, then the difference between
Scalia and Hutchinson is that the former's conservative (political) might
emantes from the Supreme Court of the United States, whereas the
latter's progressive (epistemological) might emanates from the
university. To my mind, this is the crucial significance of the law and
politics of might.
To be clear, my point is not that I disagree with Hutchinson's
inadvertently Hobbesian message. Nor am I arguing that it is impossible
for some progressive things to emerge from the adjudicative process. My
concern is that Game is pervaded by a false optimism that nonfoundational ludicism is the progressive way to go. Hutchinson's nonfoundationalist and deconstructive conception of game playing is
premised upon a hunch. "As an activity that is always beyond absolute
determination and never fully finished, adjudication not only passively
99

Ibid.at 257.

100 Ibid. at 258.
101 Ibid.
102

Ibid at 217.

103

Ibi. at 218. Also, see ibid. at 234:" ... whether [anything] actually does or does not go will
depend on many things, including the political context, the individualized circumstances of each
adjudicative incidence, the personalities involved, and the perceived implications of different
resolutions;" and ibid. at 242, in what way is this different from his criticism of other theories: "the
explanations become either so abstract as to lack any practical predictive force or so elaborate as to
capture only a particular historical moment in time"? See also ibid. at 329.
104

Ibid. at 253.
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allows but also actively encourages transformative and disruptive acts,
because, without them, the game risks paralysis and irrelevance .... "105
While he admits "that everything is a matter of risk and strategy," 06 he
is deeply committed to the idea that the nature of the game might just
encourage judges to do the right thing. But in this he makes a crucial
assumption about human motivation. Drawing on Margaret Radin, he
suggests:
"Once we admit that the rules are mutable and inextricable from material social practice,
we will at least experience a psychological change in the way we perceive our roles as
legal actors." There will still be general agreement on what particular rules mean, and
individual judges will still experience the same degree of (in)determinacy, but the vital
justification for that result will be subverted and the question of authority will be
challenged. Judges will no longer be able to claim that "the rule made me do it" but
instead will have7 to take greater responsibility for judicial decisions and their social
10
consequences.

Again, let me draw upon my experiences with judicial education
programmes. Recently, the National Judicial Institute has been
developing a programme of social context education, that is, a
programme that is designed to provide judges with a greater insight into
the dynamics of inequality. One of the reasons why some judges resist
such knowledge is because they realize that to factor social context into
their decisionmaking processes will make their task that much more
difficult and that many of the traditional certainties which they have
historically relied upon can no longer be sustained. Unfortunately,
Hutchinson provides no account of why judges would want to engage in
a ludic enterprise which inevitably will not only make their already
demanding tasks even more difficult, but will also open them up to
challenges to their authority and even greater criticism.
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, it would seem that Hutchinson's "account" is
premised on a hunch and a hope that if judges adopt nonfoundationalism they might be more likely to do the right thing. But
even from the couple of cases that he has actually discussed there is
barely an inkling of this sanguine aspiration. Furthermore, if we locate
his conception of adjudication in the broader formative contexts of
105 Ibid. at 166.
106

Ibid. at 176.
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access to legal education, professional hierarchies and the politics of
judicial appointments, 108 the possible "might" may well be eclipsed by
the more probable "might not." 109 Given the increasing significance of
the courts as an arena of political struggle, progressives may have no
choice but to "get stuck in," as soccer players are wont to say; but in
doing so, they must never forget that there are several key imperatives:
do not squabble with your teammates; understand that referees have
their own games to play and audiences to satisfy; never underestimate
the strength of the forces arrayed against you; keep your defence tight;
and never rely on individual talent to win the game. Such injunctions will
not guarantee success, but they can guard against scoring an own goal as
a result of an unjustified optimism.

108 Devlin et aL, supra note 8.
109 j. Bakan, "Constitutional Interpretation and Social Change: You Can't Always Get What
You Want (Nor What You Need)" in R. Devlin, ed., CanadianPerspectives on Legal Theory
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1991) 445 at 445.

